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Abstract
An axiomatic analysis of the concept of unequal exchange (UE) between countries is devel-
oped in a dynamic general equilibrium model that generalises Roemer’s [22] economy with a
global capital market. The class of UE definitions that satisfy three fundamental properties -
including a correspondence between wealth, class and UE exploitation status - is completely
characterised. It is shown that this class is nonempty and a definition of UE exploitation be-
tween countries is proposed, which is theoretically robust and firmly anchored to empirically
observable data. The full class and UE exploitation structure of the international economy
is derived in equilibrium.
JEL classification: D63; F02; B51.
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1 Introduction
Egalitarians - and more specifically, socialists - have long questioned the structure of inter-
national relations, pointing in particular at the large inequalities in income and standard
of living among countries. An influential analysis within this tradition has been developed
by the so-called dependence school, according to which such inequalities are the product of
exploitative relations between rich and poor nations.1 In his classic work, for example, Em-
manuel [9] has argued that the core-periphery structure of international relations generates
an unequal exchange (UE) between rich and poor nations. According to Emmanuel, given
institutionalised wage differentials between developed and less developed nations, capital
mobility across borders and the international trade of commodities cause a transfer of sur-
plus labour from poor nations with low capital-labour ratios to wealthy nations with high
capital-labour ratios, which results in the impoverishment of the former to the advantage of
the latter.
UE theory has generated substantial controversy on both empirical and theoretical grounds.
Empirically, some studies emphasise the positive effects of international exchanges and pro-
vide evidence suggesting that the “movement toward free trade may actually have just the
opposite effect [than predicted by UE theory], leading to a reduction in income disparity
among countries” (Ben-David [4], p.653). UE theory is deemed theoretically doubtful, be-
cause it is based on the comparison between the amounts of labour embodied in the goods
traded, and the notion of labour embodied is widely considered to be metaphysical and -
at best - of very limited validity, as it can only be defined in rather special cases.2 In this
paper, we examine the theoretical foundations of UE theory in order to determine whether
a general, consistent, and empirically grounded definition of UE can be identified.3
The starting point of our investigation is a seminal contribution by Roemer [22], which
1The literature is too vast for a comprehensive list of references. For a discussion of the classic contribu-
tions, we refer the reader to the excellent reviews by Bacha [3] and Griffin and Gurley [13].
2UE theory is also criticised because it contradicts the principle of comparative advantage, according to
which profit equalisation and capital flows from rich to poor countries have growth-inducing and inequality-
reducing effects. See, for example, the debate between Paul Samuelson and Arghiri Emmanuel in The Journal
of International Economics in 1978.
3Empirically, we simply note that recent studies have provided evidence supporting the idea that inter-
national inequalities have indeed increased. See, for example, Slaughter [26].
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provides an elegant analysis of UE between countries, in a static model with revenue-
maximising countries and a Leontief technology (see also Roemer [21]). Roemer [22] departs
from the standard UE approach in two key respects. First, he adopts a rigorous definition of
UE exploitation that is unrelated to the labour theory of value and that does not presume
global markets to be non-competitive. Second, in order to analyse the normative founda-
tions of UE theory, he focuses on a model in which “all differences between countries [are
eliminated] save one: the capital-labor ratio” (Roemer [22], p.35). This allows him to show
that class relations and UE exploitation emerge in the international economy, even assuming
perfectly competitive global commodity and credit markets, and even if all countries have
access to the same technology and share the same preferences. In equilibrium, the global
economy is characterised both by mutual gains from trade and by asymmetric international
relations because the economic development of less developed countries is crucially depen-
dent on capital exports from developed countries, and surplus is transferred from the former
to the latter via international capital markets. “Unequal exchange does not preempt mutual
gains from trade” (ibid.).4 Major heterogeneities in institutions, technology or preferences
and market imperfections are unessential for these results: unequal and asymmetric rela-
tions between countries “can be entirely explained by differential capital-labor ratios across
countries” (Roemer [22], p.34).
As insightful as Roemer’s [21, 22] contributions are, it is still an open question whether
his key insights are robust. It is not clear, for example, whether Roemer’s conclusions
hold under more general assumptions concerning preferences and technology, and outside of
static models. In later contributions, Roemer himself has raised doubts on the generality
of UE theory,5 and on the possibility of identifying a rigorous definition that captures the
fundamental normative intuitions of UE exploitation.
In this paper, we investigate the robustness of UE theory and extend Roemer’s [21,
22] analysis by adopting a more general formal framework and a different methodological
approach. Formally, instead of restricting attention to static, one-period economies, we set up
4This insight is compatible with the classical Marxian theory of exploitation, as Marx ([15], chapter 20,
(e)) notes that “a richer country exploits a poorer one, even when the latter benefits from the exchange.”
5For example, Roemer [23]. See Veneziani [28] for a thorough discussion.
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a dynamic general equilibrium model of the global economy in which intertemporal decisions
are explicitly considered and the concept of UE exploitation is analysed at general dynamic
equilibria. Further, the model incorporates more general assumptions on preferences - by
assuming that countries’ welfare depends both on consumption and on leisure - and on
technology - by allowing for convex production sets.
Methodologically, instead of focusing on a specific definition of UE exploitation, we adopt
the axiomatic approach pioneered by Yoshihara and Veneziani [33] and significantly extend
it by considering different properties, and by requiring our axioms to hold at general dynamic
equilibria. We examine three fundamental properties. The first one, called Labour Exploita-
tion (LE), is a domain axiom that captures some basic intuitions defining the core of UE
theory that all admissible definitions should satisfy. It is a dynamic generalisation of similar
properties formulated in the literature (see, e.g., [31, 29, 30]), and it reduces to the latter
in the special case of a static, one-period economy. Intuitively, according to LE, exploita-
tive international relations are characterised by systematic differences between the labour
performed by agents in a country and the amount of labour ‘contained’ in some reference
commodity bundles that capture their consumption possibilities.6
The other two properties, called the Class-Exploitation Correspondence Principle (CECP)
and the Wealth-Exploitation Correspondence Principle (WECP) capture axiomatically two
intuitions of UE theory originally introduced by Roemer [21, 22], who proved them to hold
in certain economies, under specific UE definitions. According to CECP, a correspondence
should exist between a country’s position in the global capital market and its exploitation
status: in equilibrium, nations that optimise by lending capital abroad should emerge as
UE exploiters, whereas nations that optimise by borrowing capital should be UE exploited.
CECP has been first formulated axiomatically by Yoshihara [31] in a static context; we ex-
tend it here to hold at general dynamic equilibria. WECP is a novel axiom in the literature:
it states that the exploitation status of countries in the international arena should be deter-
mined by their level of development (proxied by the value of their productive endowments).
6A rigorous statement of all three axioms is in section 4. LE is conceptually related to the classic theories
of unequal exchange (Emmanuel [9]) and underdevelopment (Amin [2], Frank [11]).
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We completely characterise the class of UE definitions that satisfy all three axioms at
the general dynamic equilibria of the international economy. Then, we prove that this class
is nonempty: a definition recently proposed by Yoshihara and Veneziani [31, 33, 29] based
on the ‘New Interpretation’ (Duménil [6, 7]; Foley [12]; Duménil et al [8]) satisfies all three
properties. Contrary to the received view, a rigorous and logically consistent definition of
unequal, exploitative exchange exists, which is firmly anchored to empirically observable
data and extends the key insights of UE theory to general, dynamic international economies.
Our analysis here continues a research programme in axiomatic exploitation theory
started in Yoshihara and Veneziani [33] (see also [31, 29, 30]) and significantly extends
it to the dynamic context, and to deal with different intuitions of UE theory, formalised in a
different set of axioms. We analyse general intertemporal economies because this allows us
to evaluate the robustness of Roemer’s [21, 22] key insights, and the generality of the ‘New
Interpretation’, but also because they raise some important conceptual and formal issues in
axiomatic UE theory. In fact, as shown below, in a dynamic context, the appropriate def-
inition of UE exploitation depends on the normative relevance of agents’ consumption and
savings decisions, and this requires a number of adjustments in the conceptual framework,
in the axiomatic system, and in the formal arguments.
To be sure, this paper does not fully answer the question of the normative relevance of
UE and the wrongfulness of exploitative international relations. Yet the rigorous, axiomatic
characterisation of a nonempty class of definitions that preserve some key insights of UE
theory is a crucial first step in order to address that question.7
2 The Model
The economy consists of a set N = {1, ..., N} of countries, with generic element ν, in which a
sequence of nonoverlapping generations exist, each living for T periods,8 and indexed by the
7We discuss some normative implications of UE exploitation theory in Veneziani [27, 28] and Yoshihara
and Veneziani [33].
8We specify the framework in the case with a finite T in order to highlight the similarity with Roemer’s
[21, 22] economies. However, the notation and definitions can be extended in a straightforward way to the
case with one infinitely-lived generation, and all of our results hold both if T is finite and if it is infinite.
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date of birth kT , k = 0, 1, 2, ... In every period t, countries consume n produced commodities,
and leisure. Technology is freely available to all countries: in every t, capitalists in each
country can operate any activity in the production set P ⊆ R2n+1, with generic element
α = (−αl,−α, α), where αl ∈ R+ is the direct labour input; α ∈ Rn+ are the inputs of the n
goods; and α ∈ Rn+ are the outputs of the n goods. The net output vector arising from α is
denoted as α̂ ≡ α−α. Let 0 be the null vector. The set P is assumed to be a closed convex
cone containing the origin in R2n+1, and to satisfy the following standard properties.9
Assumption 1 (A1). For all α ∈ P , if α ≥ 0 then αl > 0 and α ≥ 0.
Assumption 2 (A2). For all c ∈ Rn+ , there exists α ∈ P such that α̂ = c.
Assumption 3 (A3). For all α ∈ P , and for all (−α′, α′) ∈ Rn− × Rn+ , if (−α′, α′) 5
(−α, α) then (−αl,−α′, α′) ∈ P .
A1 implies that labour and some capital are indispensable to produce any output; A2 states
that any non-negative commodity bundle is producible as net output; A3 is a standard free
disposal condition. The set of efficient production activities is ∂P = {α ∈ P | @α′ ∈ P such that α′ > α}.
Commodities and capital can freely migrate across borders, while labour is immobile. In
every t, (pt, rt) is the 1 × (n + 1) international price vector, where pt denotes the prices of
the n commodities and rt is the interest rate that prevails in competitive capital markets. In
order to focus on international inequalities, agents are assumed to be identical within each
country; thus, the superscript ν denotes both a country and its representative agent.
Following Roemer [21, 22], we explicitly model the time structure of exchange and pro-
duction. Each production period t is divided into two stages: the capital market and the
market for productive assets operate at the beginning of t, where goods are exchanged at the
prices pt−1 ruling at the end of t− 1/beginning of t. At the beginning of t, ωνt is the vector
of productive assets owned by ν, - where ωνkT denotes the endowments inherited when born
in kT , - and the market value of ν’s endowments, ν’s wealth, is W νt = pt−1ω
ν
t .
At the beginning of every t, each ν ∈ N can borrow an amount pt−1βνt on the international
9Vector inequalities: for all x, y ∈ Rm, x = y if and only if xi = yi (i = 1, . . . ,m); x ≥ y if and only if
x = y and x 6= y; x > y if and only if xi > yi (i = 1, . . . ,m).
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credit market to purchase βν
t










P . Otherwise, it can use its wealth W νt either to purchase capital goods α
ν
t to operate activity
ανt = (−ανlt,−ανt , ανt ) ∈ P ; or to buy commodities δνt ∈ Rn+ to be stored and sold at the end
of the period; or to lend capital zνt ∈ R+ abroad.
Because production takes time, output is exchanged on the final goods market at the end







and the return to lending zνt is (1 + rt) z
ν
t , thus gross national income






+(1 + rt) z
ν
t from which the rental cost of the borrowed capital
(1 + rt) pt−1β
ν
t
must be paid. The rest of ν’s income can be used to purchase consumption
goods cνt ∈ Rn+ and to finance accumulation ωνt+1 ∈ Rn+ .
Given production decisions (ανt , β
ν
t ), in every t, the total amount of labour performed by
agents in ν ∈ N is given by Λνt = ανlt + βνlt and it cannot exceed the labour endowment, L,
which is assumed to be the same for all countries without loss of generality. Therefore for
each ν ∈ N , leisure enjoyed at t is lνt = L− Λνt , and we assume that country ν’s welfare at
t can be represented by a function u : Rn+ × [0, L] → R+: u(ct, lt) can be interpreted either
as a standard utility function or as an objectivist index of well-being.10
In order to characterise the structure of international relations and the dynamic pattern
of exploitation and classes, it is necessary to impose some structure on the function u. We
assume that u(ct, lt) = φ (lt) + v(ct), where v : Rn+ → R and φ : [0, L] → R are strictly
increasing and twice differentiable. Further, in order to avoid a number of unnecessary
technicalities, we assume that v is strictly quasi-concave and homogeneous of degree one,
while φ is strictly concave with liml→L φ
′ (l) = 0 and liml→0 φ
′ (l) =∞.
These assumptions significantly generalise the canonical models of exploitation theory
by Roemer [21, 22]. They are appropriate from a normative perspective (see, for example,
Silvestre [25]), and standard in international economics - and specifically, in the literature on
Heckscher-Ohlin models (see, for example, Chen [5]). The assumptions on φ, for example,
rule out implausible equilibria with countries performing zero labour, or enjoying no leisure
10For a discussion of subjective and objective principles, see Roemer and Veneziani [24] and, in the context
of exploitation theory, Yoshihara and Veneziani [34].
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at all. It is worth stressing, however, that the restrictions on u are imposed mostly for
technical convenience, and the main results of this paper can be derived under more general
assumptions, albeit at the cost of a significant increase in technicalities.11
Let cν = {cνt }
(k+1)T−1
t=kT be ν’s lifetime consumption plan; and likewise for α
ν , βν , zν , δν ,





be ν’s lifetime accumulation plan. Let (p, r) =
{(pt, rt)}(k+1)T−1t=kT be the path of international price vectors during the lifetime of a gen-
eration. Let ξν = (αν , βν , zν , δν , cν , ων ) denote a generic intertemporal plan for ν. Let
0 < ρ 5 1 be the time preference factor. Each ν is assumed to choose ξν to maximise welfare
subject to the constraint that in every t, (1) gross national income is sufficient for consump-
tion and accumulation; (2) wealth is sufficient for production and lending; (3) production
activities are technologically feasible. Finally, (4) we follow Roemer [21, 22] and assume that
each agent optimises subject to the requirement that he does “not run down the value of his
assets, which is the reproducibility requirement” (Roemer [21], p.63). Unlike in Roemer’s
static economies, however, the reproducibility condition (4) does not hold in every period.
In any given t, agents can use their wealth to finance consumption but every generation k
is constrained to bequeath at the end of its life at least as much wealth as they inherited.
Formally, given (p, r), each ν solves programme MP ν .12




ρt [φ (L− Λνt ) + v(cνt )] ,







t − (1 + rt) pt−1βνt
]


























11For example, it is possible to allow for heterogeneous preferences over consumption goods with
uν (cνt , l
ν
t ) = φ (L− Λνt ) + vν (cνt ); a weakly concave φ; v being homogeneous of degree k < 1; and so on.
12Constraints (1)-(2) are written as equalities without loss of generality, given the monotonicity of u.
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MP ν is a suitable way of modelling country ν’s decision problem, given the representative-
agent assumption, and it generalises Roemer’s [21, 22] static models in which countries
maximise national income.
In order to capture the role of financial markets in exploitative international relations,
only short-term credit contracts are considered as in Roemer [21, 22]: within each period,
countries can operate on the international capital market to finance their production plans,
but contracts do not extend over time and credit plays a limited role in fostering accumula-
tion. Consumption, debt, and savings must be financed out of current revenue. Due to the
possibility of saving, and noting that net savings are allowed to be negative, however, Roe-
mer’s [21, 22] static models are generalised by allowing for intertemporal trade-offs within a
country, consistently with a dynamic setting in which agents live for more than one period.









. Let E (P,N , u, ρ,ΩkT ), or as a shorthand notation E(ΩkT ), denote
the international economy with technology P , countries N , welfare function u with discount




t ; and likewise for all other
variables. For the sake of simplicity, let “for all t” stand for “for all t = kT, . . . , (k+1)T−1”.
Following Roemer [21, 22], the equilibrium concept can now be defined.13
Definition 1: A reproducible solution (RS) for E(ΩkT ) is a price vector (p, r) and an
associated profile of actions (ξν )ν∈N such that:
(i) ξν ∈ Oν (p, r) for all ν ∈ N ;
(ii) αt + βt + δt = ct + ωt+1 with αt + βt ≥ 0 for all t;
(iii) αt + βt + δt 5 ωt for all t;
(iv) pt−1βt = zt for all t;
(v) ω(k+1)T = ωkT .
In other words, at a RS, (i) every country optimises. Conditions (ii) and (iii) are standard
excess demand conditions: in the markets for final goods and capital goods, respectively,
aggregate demand should not exceed aggregate supply in any period. Condition (ii) also
13The existence of a reproducible solution is proved in the Addendum.
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requires the RS to be non-trivial in that some production takes place in every period. Con-
dition (iv) requires that the international credit market clears in every period. Finally, the
reproducibility condition (v) is a generalisation of analogous equilibrium conditions imposed
by Roemer [20, 21, 22]: it requires that every generation leaves to the following at least
as many resources as they inherited. As Roemer ([20], p.507) has argued, the notion of
reproducibility is one of the distinctive features of the concept of equilibrium in the formal
literature on exploitation theory (compared to a more standard concept of general equilib-
rium). It is also a standard condition in Ramsey-type growth models with a finite horizon
(see, e.g., Morishima’s [16] classic model) and it is quite natural given that countries - rather
than individuals - are the focus of analysis. For, although each generation dies, the country
itself lives on, and so its capital stock should not be depleted.
In the rest of this section, we derive some preliminary results that describe the char-
acteristics of the equilibria of the international economy. First, the strict monotonicity of




: by the assumptions on P , wmaxt is well-defined. Hence let
Pwt (p, r) =
{




. Proposition 1 proves that only processes with
the highest return to labour are activated and, as is well-known in international economics,
even without an international labour market, wages are equalised in all countries at all t.
Proposition 1: Let
(
(p, r) , (ξν )ν∈N
)
be a RS for E(ΩkT ). Then w
max
t > 0 for all t, and
ανt , β
ν
t ∈ Pwt (p, r) for all ν and all t.
Proof: 1. Suppose, contrary to the statement, that wmaxt 5 0 for some t. Then 1 + rt > 0
and at the solution to MP ν , it must be ανt = β
ν
t = 0 for all ν. To see this, note that, since
pt > 0, all t, if either α
ν
t ≥ 0 or β
ν
t ≥ 0 for some ν, then by A1 agent ν can reduce labour
performed and increase revenues by setting α′νt = β
′ν
t = 0 and z
′
t = zt + pt−1α
ν . Therefore
αt = βt = 0 which contradicts Definition 1(b).
2. The second part of the statement follows immediately from MP ν .
At any RS, 1 + rt = maxi
pit
pit−1
must also hold at all t. For if there were some good i such
that pit
pit−1
> 1 + rt, at some t, then noting that by Proposition 1 w
max
t > 0, at the solution
9













> 0 by pt > 0 and A1, all ν ∈ N . This contradicts Definition 1(iv).
Lemma 1 proves a useful property of the set of solutions of MP ν .




t. For all ν ∈ N , if (αν , βν , zν , δν , cν , ων ) solves MP ν , then (α′ν , β′ν , z′ν , δν , cν , ων ) also


















t ∈ P , and
z′νt = 0, all t.





lt, at all t and c
′ν = cν . Hence (α′ν , β′ν , z′ν , δν , cν , ων ) yields the same welfare.
By Lemma 1, and the convexity of P , we can consider solutions of MP ν with αν = 0,
without loss of generality.




kT , all ν. Hence, at a




kT is feasible and optimal for





(p, r) , (ξν )ν∈N
)
is a RS for E(ΩkT ), then it is also a RS for E(Ω(k+1)T ), and in
what follows generation k = 0 can be considered without loss of generality.
A subset of equilibria of particular interest are those where agents optimise at an interior
solution. Thus:
Definition 2: An interior RS (IRS) for E(ΩkT ) is a RS such that for all ν, ξ
ν ∈ Oν (p, r)
is an interior solution to MP ν with cνt > 0 for all t.
The next result proves a necessary condition for an IRS.
Lemma 2: Let
(
(p, r) , (ξν )ν∈N
)






= ρ(1 + rt+1)
φ′(L−Λ∗t+1)
wmaxt+1
, for all t.
Proof: 1. By Proposition 1, for all ν ∈ N , at the solution toMP ν , it must be (1 + rt) pt−1ωνt +
wmaxt Λ
ν
t = ptct + ptω
ν
t+1, all t. Then it is immediate to prove that, at an interior so-
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for all i, j. By the linear homogeneity of v(.), this implies that at






for all ν, µ ∈ N , and therefore
v′i (c
∗ν




t ) and φ
′ (L− Λ∗νt ) = φ′ (L− Λ
∗µ
t ) for all ν, µ ∈ N . The first part of the
statement then follows from the strict concavity of φ.









, for all i, j. Then by step 1, at













> 0, at all t and
for all ν ∈ N . Take any two adjacent periods t,t + 1, and consider ν ∈ N such that
ptω
ν
t+1 > 0. Consider a small one-period perturbation of ω






























for all i and all ν ∈ N . By the


















t+1. Therefore a necessary condition for ξ
ν ∈ Oν (p, r) to be an in-











t+1 5 0 for all dω
ν
t+1,
which holds only if the expression in brackets is equal to zero.
3 The International Class Structure
In this section, we derive the international class structure, where “classes of countries can be
defined with reference to the use of the credit market” (Roemer [22], p.54). Let (a1, a2, a3)
be a vector where ai ∈ {+,0}, i = 1, 3, a2 ∈ {+, 0}, and “+” means a non-zero vector in the
appropriate place. We extend Roemer’s definition of classes within each period t.
Definition 3: Let
(
(p, r) , (ξν )ν∈N
)
be a RS for E(Ω0). Country ν is said to be a member
of class (a1, a2, a3) within period t, or WPt class (a1, a2, a3), if there is a ξ
′ν ∈ Oν (p, r) with




t ) has the form (a1, a2, a3) in t.
There are eight conceivable classes (a1, a2, a3), but only four of them are theoretically
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relevant, as argued by Roemer [21]. At a RS
(
(p, r) , (ξν )ν∈N
)
for E(Ω0), at all t, let Γ
ν
t =
{(α′νt , z′νt , β′νt ) | ξ′ν ∈ Oν (p, r) with ω′ν = ων}. We say that Γνt has a solution of the form
(a1, a2, a3) \ (a′1, a′2, a′3) to mean that Γνt contains a vector (α′νt , z′νt , β′νt ) of the form (a1, a2, a3)





C1t = {ν ∈ N | Γνt has a solution of the form (+,+,0) \ (+, 0,0)} ,
C2t = {ν ∈ N | Γνt has a solution of the form (+, 0,0)} ,
C3t = {ν ∈ N | Γνt has a solution of the form (+, 0,+) \ (+, 0,0)} ,
C4t = {ν ∈ N | Γνt has a solution of the form (0, 0,+)} .
At all t, countries in C1t are net lenders in the global market; countries in C
2
t can optimise
without using the capital market; countries in C3t must borrow foreign capital to optimise;
countries in C4t must borrow all of their operating capital. This definition of classes based on
credit relations conveys the intuition that a country’s position in the capital market affects
its international status.
Below, it is proved that in equilibrium the set of countries N can indeed be partitioned
into these four WPt classes at all t. First, Lemma 3 proves that WPt classes (+,+,+) and
(0,+,+) can be ignored.
Lemma 3: Let
(
(p, r) , (ξν )ν∈N
)
be an IRS for E(Ω0). Let ξ
ν ∈ Oν (p, r) be such that ν is
a member of WPt class (+,+,+) or (0,+,+) in t. Then:
if z′νt > pt−1β
′ν
t




t ) ∈ Γνt , then ν ∈ C1t ;
if z′νt = pt−1β
′ν
t




t ) ∈ Γνt , then ν ∈ C2t ;
if z′νt < pt−1β
′ν
t




t ) ∈ Γνt , then ν ∈ C3t .
Proof: 1. By the convexity of MP ν , it follows that if z′νt < pt−1β
′ν
t














t ) ∈ Γνt , then there exists (α′′′νt , z′′′νt , β′′′νt ) ∈





. Therefore, the three cases in the statement are mutually
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exclusive and they decompose the set of agents with W νt > 0 into disjoint sets.
2. Suppose z′νt > pt−1β
′ν
t













t − pt−1βνt > 0, and β
′ν
t = 0. By the convexity of P , α
′ν



















t ) ∈ Γνt . Thus,
it remains to show that there is no solution in Γνt of the form (+, 0,0). Suppose, by way of

















t . Clearly, β
′ν
t ∈ P , β′νlt = ανlt + βνlt












t ) ∈ Γνt , contradicting the
assumption that z′νt > pt−1β
′ν
t




t ) ∈ Γνt .
3. The other two cases are proved similarly.
Lemma 3 substantiates the claim that a country’s class status is determined by its position
in the capital market: net lenders form the ‘upper’ strata of the global economy, whereas
net borrowers occupy ‘lower’ positions. It is therefore natural to investigate whether class
status (and so a country’s position in the credit market) is determined by its wealth.
Consider an IRS. At all t, let αmint be defined as follows: α
min









, and αminlt = Λ
∗
t , where Λ
∗
t > 0 is defined in Lemma 2. Similarly, α
max
t








, and αmaxlt = Λ
∗









t are well-defined. Theorem 1 generalises one of the
main results of Roemer’s theory of classes: at an IRS, WPt classes are pairwise disjoint and
exhaustive, and WPt class status depends on a country’s wealth.
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Theorem 1 (The Dependence School Theorem): Let
(
(p, r) , (ξν )ν∈N
)
be an IRS for E(Ω0)
such that 1 + rt > maxi
pit
pit−1
for all t. Then at all t:
(i) ν ∈ C1t ⇔ pt−1αmaxt < W νt ;
(ii) ν ∈ C2t ⇔ pt−1αmint 5 W νt 5 pt−1αmaxt ;
(iii) ν ∈ C3t ⇔ 0 < W νt < pt−1αmint ;
(iv) ν ∈ C4t ⇔ W νt = 0.
14The condition 1 + rt > maxi
pit
pit−1
ensures that undertaking production activities is better than storing
goods to be sold at the end of the period. In order to interpret this condition, note that at a stationary IRS
with pt = pt−1 it reduces to the familiar requirement that rt > 0.
13






lt > 0, all ν ∈ N .
2. By step 1, it immediately follows that at any t, ν ∈ C4t if and only if W νt = 0.






t . We show that Γ
ν
t has a
solution of the form (+, 0,0). By step 1, and noting that 1 + rt > 0, at an IRS it must
be wmaxt Λ
∗




































t , by the convexity of P , it follows that there exists





t . Conversely, if ν ∈ C2t , then there exists αt ∈ Pwt (p, r) such that
(1 + rt) pt−1αt + w
max




t+1, with pt−1αt = W
ν
t and αlt = Λ
∗








4. Parts (i) and (iii) are proved similarly.
In order to clarify the normative relevance of Theorem 1, note that country ν’s wealth,
W νt , can be seen as the main proxy for its level of development. Theorem 1 implies that in
equilibrium less developed countries (with a lower W νt ) are net borrowers, whereas developed
countries (with a higher W νt ) are net lenders: a nation’s wealth (and development) level
determines its class status. Given that international markets for commodities and capital are
perfectly competitive, in equilibrium all countries enjoy benefits from trade, as international
capital flows allow poor countries to improve their lot. Yet, the IRS is also characterised
by a four-class structure which reflects the wealth hierarchy and an asymmetric relationship
between countries. For the economic development of the countries in C3t ∪ C4t is crucially
dependent on the existence of the rich countries in C1t which export their capital to the poor,
whereas the rich in C1t could realise a certain economic development with full employment
by themselves alone. In this sense, Theorem 1 captures some of the key insights of the
‘dependence school’ discussed in the Introduction, and is named accordingly.
As noted by an anonymous referee, Theorem 1 echoes a standard result in neoclassical
models in which foreign capital flows into underdeveloped countries because their endowment
of capital per capita is lower and therefore its marginal product is higher. At a closer look,
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however, some important differences emerge. Although our assumptions on technology allow
for smooth production sets, we are not postulating the existence of a differentiable aggregate
production function and therefore cannot derive any conclusions concerning the marginal
productivity of capital. The world interest rate is unique because of perfect competition in
the capital market but in principle there may be multiple equilibrium values of rt in any
period, none of which necessarily linked to a notion of marginal product of capital. Capital
flows are not driven by the search of the investment yielding the highest return: they are
determined by agents’ optimising choices on consumption, savings and leisure. Thus, for
example, in any t, a wealthy nation uses its capital to finance internal production up to
the point where its citizens are spending the optimal amount of labour. It then lends any
remaining capital - at the given international rate - in order to increase consumption, or
savings. (And a similar logic drives borrowing decisions in poor countries.)
4 Exploitative International Relations
Exploitation in international relations is conceived of as the unequal exchange of labour
between countries as in Roemer [21, 22]: exploitative international relations are characterised
by systematic differences between the labour ‘contributed’ by agents in country ν and the
labour ‘received’ by them via their national income. As intuitive as this definition may
seem, in general economies the notions of labour ‘contributed’ and labour ‘received’ are not
obvious. Indeed, the very existence of a general, consistent definition which preserves the
key insights of UE theory has been put into doubt. In this section, we develop an axiomatic
analysis of UE exploitation and characterise a class of definitions that satisfy three important
properties. In the next section, we prove that the class is nonempty.
4.1 A domain axiom
In economies with homogeneous labour, the labour ‘contributed’ by ν coincides with the
labour performed by workers in ν, Λνt .
15 Outside of static, two-class Leontief economies
15For a generalisation to economies with heterogeneous labour, see Veneziani and Yoshihara [30, 29].
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with subsistence wages, instead, many different definitions of the labour ‘received’ by ν
can be, and have in fact been proposed, which incorporate different normative and positive
views.16 In recent work, Yoshihara and Veneziani [33, 31, 30, 29] have proposed an axiom
that identifies the domain of admissible UE definitions: it imposes some weak restrictions on
the notion of labour received and all of the main approaches satisfy it in static economies.
In this subsection, we generalise it to the dynamic context.
At the most general level, in UE theory, the amount of labour ‘received’ by agent ν is
determined with reference to some bundles that belong to a normatively relevant budget set
and capture ν’s consumption opportunities. In static models, all of the main UE approaches
usually (albeit sometimes implicitly) assume that in equilibrium agents at least replace any
wealth used up in production in every period and stipulate that the reference bundles are, or
can be purchased with agents’ actual net incomes at all t. In the general dynamic framework
considered here, the relevant notion of agents’ net income is not obvious and the choice of
the appropriate budget set is not unambiguous.
Let
(
(p, r) , (ξν )ν∈N
)
be a RS for E(Ω0). The gross income of each ν ∈ N at t is given






t . In order to identify ν’s ‘net’ income at t in this context, the
fund for replenishing ν’s wealth pt−1ω
ν
t in the next period should be deducted after adjusting
for the difference in prices between t − 1 and t. To do so, we define the inflation index at
t, Rt ≡ ptωtpt−1ωt , taking ωt as the inflation basket. Given this index, ν’s wealth pt−1ω
ν
t at
t − 1 is evaluated as being equivalent to Rtpt−1ωνt at t. Then, ν’s ‘net’ income at t can be






t −Rtpt−1ωνt , and it identifies the normatively relevant set
of commodity bundles ‘received’ by ν:






c ∈ Rn+ | ptc = (1 + rt) pt−1ωνt + wmaxt Λνt −Rtpt−1ωνt
}
.
In other words, in a general dynamic context the set of commodity bundles ‘received’
by ν at t is defined counterfactually by considering the net income that could be devoted
to consumption if ν decided only to replace its wealth, i.e. to carry forward the real asset
16See, for example, Morishima [17] and Roemer [21]. See Yoshihara [31, 32] and Veneziani and Yoshihara
[29] for a thorough discussion.
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value of W νt to the next period.
17 The reason for this choice is threefold. First, countries are
interested in wealth, rather than in a specific vector of capital endowments. Second, from
a normative perspective, for a given gross income, in every t exploitation status should not
depend on specific saving and investment decisions, or on the specific vector of productive
endowments purchased. According to Roemer ([22], p.53), for example, the appropriate
notion of UE exploitation should be preference-independent. Third, it is immediate to




t ) is a generalisation of the standard
approach and it reduces to the latter at a RS with stationary prices and capital.
Let E denote the set of all economies E(P,N , u, ρ,Ω0) that satisfy our assumptions on
technology, agents, preferences and endowments. For all c ∈ Rn+, let ψ (c) ≡ {α ∈ P | α ≥ c}
be the set of production activities that can produce c as a portion of output. Given any
definition of exploitation, let N tert ⊆ N and N tedt ⊆ N denote, respectively, the set of
exploiters at t, or WPt exploiters, and the set of exploited agents at t, or WPt exploited
agents, at a given allocation. Our domain axiom can now be formally introduced.
Labour Exploitation (LE): Consider any economy E(Ω0) ∈ E . Let
(
(p, r) , (ξν )ν∈N
)
be a RS for E(Ω0). Given any definition of UE exploitation, in each period t two subsets
N tert ⊆ N and N tedt ⊆ N , N tert ∩N tedt = ∅, constitute the set of WPt exploiters and the set of
WPt exploited agents if and only if for any ν ∈ N , there exist cνt , cνt ∈ Bt ((p, r) ; pt−1ωνt ,Λνt )
such that there exist αc
ν
t ∈ ψ (cνt ) ∩ ∂P with ptα̂c
ν
t = ptcνt and α
cνt ∈ ψ (cνt ) ∩ ∂P with
ptα̂




l , and the following condition holds,
ν ∈ N tert ⇔ Λνt < α
cνt
l ;
ν ∈ N tedt ⇔ Λνt > α
cνt
l .
LE requires UE exploitation status to be determined based on the labour contributed by
countries (the labour performed by their citizens) and on the labour received by them, where
the latter is determined in relation both to purchasing power, and to productive conditions.




t ) does not necessarily contain ν’s actual consumption bundle at t, as ptω
ν
t+1
may be different from Rtpt−1ω
ν
t , in equilibrium.
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To be specific, by LE under any admissible definition, in equilibrium the sets N tert ,
N tedt are characterised in each t by identifying two (possibly identical) reference bundles
cνt , c
ν
t ∈ Rn+ for each ν ∈ N . The reference bundles must be affordable for any ν who
simply replaces its wealth at t (cνt , c
ν
t ∈ Bt ((p, r) ; pt−1ωνt ,Λνt )) and must be technically
producible as a portion of the output of efficient production activities while carrying forward
the real asset value of the commodity inputs of such production activities to the next period
(αc ∈ ψ (c)∩ ∂P with ptα̂c = ptc, c = cνt , cνt ).18 The labour contained in cνt , cνt is equal to the

















is the labour that ν can receive
via its ‘net income’ at t and it determines ν’s UE exploitation status at t, once compared
with the labour contributed by ν, Λνt . In equilibrium, at any t, ν is a WPt exploiter if
and only if ν works less than the minimum amount of labour that ν can receive via its ‘net
income’, α
cνt
l ; whereas ν is WPt exploited if and only if ν works more than the maximum
amount of labour that ν can receive via its ‘net income’, α
cνt
l .
LE is a weak condition that captures some fundamental insights of UE theory shared
by all of the main approaches in the literature.19 It identifies the domain of admissible
UE definitions, but it cannot discriminate among alternative definitions within this domain,
which can be large indeed. For this purpose, some additional properties must be imposed.
4.2 Class, Wealth and Exploitation
A fundamental insight of UE theory is the existence of a relation between development -
or wealth, - exploitation status, and class position in the global economy. The existence of
such a relation is often proved as a result in a given economic environment, under certain
conditions. Yet its central relevance in UE theory is such that “its epistemological status
in our understanding is as a postulate. We seek a model which will make our postulated
18Note that ptα̂
c = ptc implies ptαc 5 ptαc − ptc, where the left hand side represents the real asset value
of the commodity inputs of production activity αc.
19In particular, it is worth noting that axiom LE does not require UE exploitation status to be defined
based on imputing embodied labor magnitudes to exchanged commodity bundles as in standard approaches.
But nor does it rule out the possibility that the labour received by ν corresponds to the labour embodied in
a specific bundle. We are grateful to an anonymous referee for pointing this out.
18
belief true” (Roemer [21], p.152). In this subsection, we state this intuition axiomatically and
formalise two properties that incorporate the relation between wealth, class, and exploitation
status. Then, we provide a characterisation of the class of definitions of UE exploitation that
satisfy LE and both properties, in the dynamic international economies considered here.
The first property captures the intuition that richer countries are UE exploiters while
less developed countries suffer from UE exploitation:
Wealth-Exploitation Correspondence Principle (WECP): Let
(
(p, r) , (ξν )ν∈N
)
be an
IRS for E(P,N , u, ρ,Ω0) such that 1+rt−Rt > 0 for all t. For each t, there exist W t,W t > 0











(p, r) , (ξ′ν)ν∈N
)








t , all t:
W ′νt > W t ⇔ ν ∈ N tert ;
W ′νt < W t ⇔ ν ∈ N tedt .
WECP states that, in equilibrium, in any given period there should be two (possibly
equal) threshold wealth levels, W t,W t, such that the set of WPt exploiters (resp., WPt
exploited) corresponds to the set of countries with wealth higher than W t (resp., lower than
W t). The threshold levels may depend on equilibrium prices and aggregate endowments,
but not on the equilibrium wealth distribution.
The next Lemma characterises the set of definitions that satisfy WECP.
Lemma 4 (WECP): Let
(
(p, r) , (ξν )ν∈N
)
be an IRS for E(P,N , u, ρ,Ω0) such that 1 +
rt − Rt > 0 for all t. Given any definition of UE exploitation satisfying LE, the following
statements are equivalent :
(i) WECP holds;









0 and any IRS
(
(p, r) , (ξ′ν)ν∈N
)









t , all t, and for each ν ∈ N ,
W ′νt > W t ⇔ W ′νt >
ptc
′ν
t − wmaxt α
c′νt
l
1 + rt −Rt
;
W ′νt < W t ⇔ W ′νt <
ptc
′ν
t − wmaxt α
c′νt
l
1 + rt −Rt
.
Proof: 1. Consider any economy E(P,N , u, ρ,Ω′0) ∈ E and any IRS
(
(p, r) , (ξ′ν )ν∈N
)
for E(P,N , u, ρ,Ω′0). Given a definition of exploitation satisfying LE, at any t, for each
ν ∈ N , there exist c′νt , c′νt ∈ Bt ((p, r) ;W ′νt ,Λ′νt ) such that there exist αc
′ν
t ∈ ψ (c′νt ) ∩ ∂P
with ptα̂
c′νt = ptc′νt and α
c′νt ∈ ψ (c′νt ) ∩ ∂P with ptα̂c
′ν





ν ∈ N tert ⇔ Λ′νt < α
c′νt
l , and ν ∈ N tedt ⇔ Λ′νt > α
c′νt
l .
2. In order to prove the result, it is sufficient to show that for any economyE(P,N , u, ρ,Ω′0) ∈
E and any IRS
(
(p, r) , (ξ′ν )ν∈N
)
for E(P,N , u, ρ,Ω′0), the following conditions hold at any
t and for each ν ∈ N ,
ν ∈ N tert ⇔ W ′νt >
ptc
′ν
t − wmaxt α
c′νt
l
1 + rt −Rt
; (5)
ν ∈ N tedt ⇔ W ′νt <
ptc
′ν
t − wmaxt α
c′νt
l
1 + rt −Rt
. (6)
Consider (5). By LE, ν ∈ N tert ⇔ Λ′νt < α
c′νt
l . Moreover, c
′ν
t ∈ Bt ((p, r) ;W ′νt ,Λ′νt ) implies
ptc
′ν








desired inequality follows by rearranging the latter expression and noting that 1+rt−Rt > 0.
A similar argument proves that (6) also holds.
Theorem 1 and Lemma 4 provide two different partitions of the set of countries, according
to their UE exploitation or class status. Depending on the UE definition that one adopts,
the two partitions may or may not coincide. Yet, an important intuition of UE theory is the
existence of a robust relation between class and UE exploitation status. Based on Roemer
[21], we formulate this intuition explicitly as follows:
Class-Exploitation Correspondence Principle (CECP): Let
(




IRS for E(Ω0) such that 1 + rt −Rt > 0 for all t. Then, at all t
ν ∈ C1t ⇒ ν ∈ N tert ;
ν ∈ C3t ∪ C4t ⇒ ν ∈ N tedt .
CECP states that in equilibrium, countries in the upper classes in the credit market
should emerge as UE exploiters, while those in the lower classes should be UE exploited.
Theorem 2 provides necessary and sufficient conditions for a UE definition in the admissible
domain to satisfy both WECP and CECP:
Theorem 2 (CECP): Let
(
(p, r) , (ξν )ν∈N
)




for all t. Given any definition of UE exploitation satisfying LE, the following
statements are equivalent :
(i) WECP and CECP hold;
(ii) at all t, there exist W t,W t > 0 with pt−1α
min
t 5 W t 5 W t 5 pt−1α
max
t such that for








0 and any IRS
(
(p, r) , (ξ′ν)ν∈N
)
for








t , all t, and for each ν ∈ N ,
W ′νt > W t ⇔ W ′νt >
ptc
′ν
t − wmaxt α
c′νt
l
1 + rt −Rt
;
W ′νt < W t ⇔ W ′νt <
ptc
′ν
t − wmaxt α
c′νt
l
1 + rt −Rt
.
Proof: 1. Consider any economy E(P,N , u, ρ,Ω′0) ∈ E and any IRS
(
(p, r) , (ξ′ν )ν∈N
)
for
E(P,N , u, ρ,Ω′0). Note that 1 + rt > maxi
pit
pit−1
for all t implies 1 + rt − Rt > 0 for all
t. Given a definition of exploitation satisfying LE, at any t, for each ν ∈ N , there exist
c′νt , c
′ν
t ∈ Bt ((p, r) ;W ′νt ,Λ′νt ) such that there exist αc
′ν
t ∈ ψ (c′νt )∩ ∂P with ptα̂c
′ν
t = ptc′νt and
αc
′ν
t ∈ ψ (c′νt )∩ ∂P with ptα̂c
′ν




l , and ν ∈ N tert ⇔ Λ′νt < α
c′νt
l and
ν ∈ N tedt ⇔ Λ′νt > α
c′νt
l .
2. ((ii)⇒(i)) Suppose that (ii) holds. Then by Lemma 4 and Theorem 1 it immediately
follows that WECP and CECP hold.
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3. ((i)⇒(ii)) Let WECP and CECP hold. By Lemma 4, it is sufficient to show that at
all t, W t 5 pt−1αmaxt and pt−1α
min
t 5 W t.
Suppose, by way of contradiction, that W t > pt−1α
max
t , some t. We consider two cases.











0 and any IRS
(
(p, r) , (ξ′ν)ν∈N
)







t , all t. By Theorem 1, C
1
t = ∅. Moreover, because W t > pt−1αmaxt , by WECP




t and that WECP
does not require wealth thresholds to be unique, it is possible to set W t = pt−1α
max
t







0 and an IRS
(
(p, r) , (ξ′ν)ν∈N
)













t , for some ν ∈ N . If pt−1αmaxt < pt−1ω′νt 5 W t,
then the desired contradiction follows from Theorem 1, CECP, and WECP. So, sup-
pose that pt−1α
max
t < W t < pt−1ω
′ν
t . Then by Lemma 2 it is immediate to show that











(p, r) , (ξ′′ν)ν∈N
)













t 5 W t for some ν ∈ N , which yields the desired contradiction.
A similar argument can be used to prove that pt−1α
min
t 5 W t.
These results fully characterise exploitative international relations in the intertemporal
model. Theorem 1 identifies the structure of the global capital market, in which developed
countries emerge as net lenders and less developed countries as net borrowers. Lemma 4
derives necessary and sufficient conditions for exploitative international relations to map
inequalities in economic development (proxied by the value of productive endowments).
Finally, Theorem 2 provides necessary and sufficient conditions for class positions in the
global credit market to map wealth inequalities and exploitation status.
It is worth stressing at this point the generality of our results, which are derived in
intertemporal economies, under rather general assumptions on preferences and technology,
and without restricting the analysis to steady states. Perhaps more importantly, they are
derived without adopting any specific UE approach: they hold for every definition within
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the admissible domain identified by LE. The relation between wealth, class and exploitation
is thus proved to hold for an entire (and potentially large) class of UE definitions.
5 A Definition of UE Exploitation
Section 4 provides a complete characterisation of the class of UE definitions that satisfy
LE, WECP and CECP. But are there any definitions that actually meet the conditions in
Theorem 2? This is not an idle question. Yoshihara [31] has shown that in static economies
with revenue-maximising agents, some of the received definitions - including Morishima’s [17]
and Roemer’s [21] - satisfy LE but not CECP. Roemer [21, 23] himself has raised doubts
on the robustness of the relation between wealth, exploitation, and class. In this section,
we show that the class of definitions identified by Theorem 2 is nonempty. To this end,
we introduce a dynamic generalisation of a definition recently proposed by Yoshihara and
Veneziani [33, 31, 29] and show that it satisfies LE and preserves WECP and CECP, in
the international economies considered in this paper.
Let
(
(p, r) , (ξν )ν∈N
)




t denote the aggregate equilib-











lt ), where τ
c








20 Thus, the labour contained in any bundle c (whose value does not exceed global in-
come) is equal to the fraction τ c of social labour, τ c (αp,rlt + β
p,r
lt ), necessary to produce a






, that has the same value as c. We denote
this as l.v. (c; (p, r) , αp,rt + β
p,r
t ): it is the labour value of c at t, at a RS with prices (p, r)
and aggregate production, αp,rt + β
p,r
t . Then:
Definition 4: Consider any economy E(Ω0) ∈ E . Let
(
(p, r) , (ξν )ν∈N
)
be a RS for
E(Ω0). At all t, country ν ∈ N , which supplies Λνt , is WPt-exploited if and only if
Λνt > l.v. (c̃
ν




t ) for any c̃
ν
t ∈ Bt ((p, r) ; pt−1ωνt ,Λνt ), and a WPt-exploiter
if and only if Λνt < l.v. (c̃
ν




t ) for any c̃
ν







= 0, we set τ ct = 0 by definition.
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Definition 4 generalises the definition proposed by Yoshihara and Veneziani [33, 31, 29]
in a static context. In static economies, exploitation status is measured with reference to
consumption bundles that agents can purchase with their actual net income. As argued in
section 4.1 above, however, in the general dynamic framework considered here, actual net
income is not necessarily a normatively appropriate variable to determine agents’ exploita-
tion status and we propose to focus instead on the net income that could be devoted to
consumption if an agent decided only to replace its wealth.
Definition 4 is conceptually related to the ‘New Interpretation’ (Duménil [6, 7]; Foley [12];
Duménil et al [8]). In fact, τ c̃
ν
t is ν’s reference share of world income, and so τ c̃
ν
t (αp,rlt + β
p,r
lt )
is the share of total social labour that ν receives by earning national income ptc̃
ν
t . Then,
as in the New Interpretation, country ν is UE exploited if and only if the amount of social
labour it receives is less than the amount of labour expended by its workers, Λνt .
Several attractive features of Definition 4 are worth noting. First, it does not rely on the
labour theory of value and is not restricted to economies with a linear technology. Second,
unlike in the standard approach, exploitation is not a merely technological phenomenon and
social relations play a central role. For in Definition 4 the definition of UE exploitation
requires knowledge of equilibrium prices and of the social reproduction point, and it is
related to the production and distribution of global income and social labour. Third, UE
exploitation is identified as a feature of the competitive allocation of social labour rather than
as the result of productive inefficiencies, or labour market imperfections. Fourth, Definition 4
transparently captures the key intuitions of UE theory. For it identifies exploitation status by
comparing the labour contributed by each country ν and the share of aggregate social labour
received by ν via its national income. Moreover, Yoshihara and Veneziani [33] have shown
that in a rich domain of (static) convex economies, Definition 4 is the only UE definition
that satisfies a small set of formally weak and theoretically desirable properties.
Theorem 3 proves that if Definition 4 is adopted then both WECP and CECP hold.
Theorem 3: Let
(
(p, r) , (ξν )ν∈N
)




t. Then, under Definition 4, WECP and CECP hold.
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Proof: 1. First, we show that Definition 4 satisfies LE at an IRS. Since
(
(p, r) , (ξν )ν∈N
)









= ωt, at all t.
Further, by Lemma 2, Λνt = Λ
∗










t pt−1ωt for each ν ∈ N . Then, at all t, and for all ν ∈ N

























Then, because 1 + rt − Rt > 0 and wmaxt > 0, all t, in each period t, there exists (τ νt )ν∈N ∈
































lt ); and ν ∈ N tedt

































t ), for all ν ∈ N , we can see that Definition 4 satisfies LE.
2. By step 1, it suffices to show that under Definition 4, statement (ii) of Theorem 2
holds. Let
(
(p, r) , (ξν )ν∈N
)
be an IRS for E(P,N , u, ρ,Ω0) such that 1 + rt > maxi pitpit−1
for all t. We show that at all t, W t = W t = W
∗
t ≡ 1N pt−1ωt > 0 satisfies all conditions in
statement (ii).











(p, r) , (ξ′ν)ν∈N
)








t , all t, W
∗
t is well
defined, unique and invariant.








0 and any IRS
(
(p, r) , (ξ′ν)ν∈N
)
25








t , all t, for each ν ∈ N , we have
ptα̂
































= τ ′νt (1 + rt −Rt) pt−1ωt.





∈ Pwt (p, r) at a RS, and the last equality follows from the definition of Rt
noting that at a RS α′p,rt + β
′p,r
t






















(p, r) , (ξ′ν)ν∈N
)








t , all t, for
each ν ∈ N ,
W ′νt > W
∗
t ⇔ W ′νt >
ptc
′ν
t − wmaxt α
c′νt
l
1 + rt −Rt
;
W ′νt < W
∗
t ⇔ W ′νt <
ptc
′ν
t − wmaxt α
c′νt
l
1 + rt −Rt
.
























In summary, statement (ii) of Theorem 2 holds under Definition 4 and therefore WECP
and CECP hold under Definition 4.
Theorem 3 implies that the set of definitions identified in Theorem 2 is nonempty. If Def-
inition 4 is adopted, then both Roemer’s [21] Class-Exploitation Correspondence Principle
and the Wealth-Exploitation Correspondence Principle can be extended to general, dynamic
equilibrium paths of international economies with general convex technologies and welfare
functions. Theorems 1 and 3 allow us to identify the structure of dependent and exploitative
international relations emerging between developed and less developed countries as the equi-
librium outcome of a perfectly competitive international economy. Mutual benefits from free
international trade of commodities and capital coexist with an international stratification of
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countries in the credit market and with unequal flows of revenue and labour.
6 Conclusion
This paper develops an axiomatic analysis of the concept of unequal exchange between
countries in a dynamic general equilibrium model, which generalises Roemer’s [21, 22] econ-
omy with a global capital market. The class of definitions that preserve three fundamental
properties of UE exploitation theory - including the existence of a correspondence between
wealth, class and exploitation status, - in general dynamic equilibria is completely charac-
terised. This class is shown to be nonempty: there exists a UE definition that satisfies a
basic domain axiom and both the Wealth-Exploitation Correspondence Principle and the
Class-Exploitation Correspondence Principle. This definition is conceptually related to the
so-called ‘New Interpretation’ (Duménil [6, 7]; Foley [12]; Duménil et al [8]). It is logically
consistent, general, and firmly anchored to empirically observed data.
Based on this definition, unequal international relations are fully characterised and Roe-
mer’s [21, 22] results generalised. In equilibrium, countries are partitioned based on their
UE exploitation status and on their position in the capital market: advanced countries are
net lenders and exploiters, less developed countries are net borrowers and suffer from UE
exploitation. Mutual gains from trade and UE exploitation coexist in competitive mar-
kets. The exploitative nature of international relations is the product of capital flows, which
transfer surplus from less developed to more developed countries.
It may be objected that in reality capital flows do not move in the direction predicted in
Theorem 1: as Lucas [14] famously argued, capital does not flow to underdeveloped countries.
Two points should be made here that suggest that the so-called “Lucas paradox” does not
pose a major challenge to our conclusions. Firstly, there is a growing empirical literature
suggesting that there may be no paradox after all: the actual pattern of credit flows may
be explained by some fundamental violations of the basic assumptions of the neoclassical
model which are also shared by Roemer’s [21, 22] model and our extension of it, such as
differences in fundamentals, including institutional quality (Alfaro et al [1]), and in credit
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risk (Reinhart and Rogoff [18]). Actually, Reinhardt et al ([19], pp.235-6) have shown that
“the prediction of the standard neoclassical theory holds only when taking into account the
degree of capital account openness, conditional on a set of fundamentals. Among countries
with an open capital account, richer countries tend to experience net capital outflows, while
poorer countries tend to experience net capital inflows. In contrast, in countries with closed
capital account, there appears to be no systematic relationship between the level of economic
development and net capital flows.” According to them, the phenomenon observed by Lucas
[14] is due to the relatively high degree of capital controls in the period he considered.
The paradox, however, disappeared in the 1990s when capital controls were lifted and “this
liberalization process was associated with significant changes in the patterns of capital flows
across countries at different income levels” (Reinhardt et al [19], p.236).21
Secondly, and perhaps more importantly, ours is not an investigation of the determi-
nants of the size and direction of capital flows in the current global economy. This paper
develops a normative, axiomatic analysis of the concept of exploitation and for this purpose
we have followed Roemer ([22], p.58) in using Occam’s razor and abstracting from “many
elements of friction or noncompetitiveness or ‘imperfections’”. These simplifying assump-
tions are theoretically appropriate from a normative perspective, as they allow us to derive
precise conclusions on the concept of UE in an abstract and general, but at the same time
well-defined context, focusing on a benchmark competitive economy. Our main axioms are
thus restricted to hold at the competitive equilibria of the intertemporal economy with un-
restricted capital flows and no labour mobility - the “classical [UE] environment” (Roemer
[22], p.53). The appropriate extension of our axiomatic analysis to noncompetitive settings
and disequilibrium allocations is an interesting and open question.
Our analysis thus provides a normative benchmark to evaluate international relations
under globalisation. For, inequalities in wealth and development among countries are at
least partly due to past “robbery and plunder” - especially during the colonial period -
21One may argue that such movements are still smaller than predicted by the standard neoclassical model
based on international differences in the marginal product of capital. As Lucas ([14], p.92) put it, “one would
expect no investment to occur in the wealthy countries in the face of return differentials of this magnitude.”
This issue is not really relevant in our framework, especially given that, as noted in section 3, international
capital flows are not determined by differences in the marginal productivity of capital.
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which makes them, and the unequal exchanges and exploitative relations resulting from
them hardly justifiable, as argued by Ferguson and Veneziani [10]. To be sure, the radical
change in ownership relations in the world economy necessary to eliminate UE exploitation
may be considered politically infeasible. This does not make the concept of UE exploitation
any less relevant. For it is essential to establish a robust normative benchmark against which
to evaluate international relations, and even if it is not possible to eliminate UE exploitation
in one stroke, there may be a number of measures to reduce it via international transfers
and redistribution. An interesting question from this perspective concerns the development
of a measure of the degree or intensity of UE exploitation of each country, and an index of
aggregate UE exploitation in the international economy that goes beyond the rather coarse
classification into UE exploiting and UE exploited nations. We leave this issue for further
research.
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